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JOINT TORTFEASORS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
JOHN W. WADE*

Much has been written regarding tort liability and the conflict of
laws and there are numerous cases in the field.' But little attention
has been paid to the conflicts aspects of the many legal problems which
surround the concept of joint tortfeasors. This paper attempts to collect the relatively few decisions on the subject and to analyze the
problems involved.
In the beginning it should be made clear that the term "joint tortfeasors" is used, unless otherwise indicated, in the broad, somewhat
colloquial sense which most American courts use today. Thus used, it
includes both joint tortfeasors in the narrow original common law
meaning, and concurrent tortfeasors whose liability is several. Joint
liability in the strict sense was imposed upon wrongdoers who were
acting in concert, each being therefore responsible for the conduct of
others; it may also exist in the case of principal and agent and other
instances of vicarious liability and in the case of breach of a joint duty.
Concurrent tortfeasors are those whose independent acts of negligence
combined to produce a single, indivisible injury so that each is held
liable for the full damage. A number of differences existed at one time
between the legal attributes of these two concepts and some may exist
today, at least in certain jurisdictions.2 These differences and others
which have developed suggest that when more than one state is involved the laws are likely to be in disagreement so that the decision
on the question of conflict of laws may well determine the outcome of
the litigation.
With this introduction, it may now be appropriate to consider some
of the more important problems.
LIABILITY AND JOINDER

Liability for the entire amount of the damage suffered by the plaintiff is normally imposed upon each tortfeasor when there is no ]ogical
way of apportioning the damages among them. This includes joint
tortfeasors (strict sense) and concurrent tortfeasors producing an
indivisible result. Courts do not always agree, of course, as to when a
Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. For general discussion and collection of authorities, see Leflar, Choice
of Law: Torts: Current Trends, suprap. 447.
2. See, in general, PROssER, TORTS § 109 (1941); WILnAm.s, JOINT TORTS AND
CoNTmuuoRy NEGLIGENCE §§ 3-5 (1951); Jackson, Joint Torts and Several
Liability, 17 TExAs L. REv. 399 (1939); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several
Liability,25 CALIF.L. REv. 413 (1937).
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result is indivisible. At early common law joinder was permissible
only of joint tortfeasors in the strict sense; today most jurisdictions
permit it in the case of all joint tortfeasors in the broad sense of the
term.
It is generally agreed that the American rule is that tort liability is
governed by the law of the place where the injury occurs. Perhaps
even greater agreement is to be found in the rule that questions of
parties to an action are governed by the law of the forum. The distinction is the familiar one between substance and procedure- a dichotomy so well established in the conflict of laws as to suggest that the
two should not even be discussed in the same sub-topic. But joinder
and liability have become so mixed and confused in the opinions discussing joint tortfeasors that the distinction is often very difficult to
draw for purposes of internal law and a corresponding difficulty may
arise in the conflict of laws.
The leading case on the subject, Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co.,3 indicates the difficulties involved and suggests the appropriate analysis.
Three oil companies, acting independently, allowed salt water and oil
to run into a stream, rendering it unsuitable for drinking by cattle
as it passed through plaintiff's ranch below. All of this occurred in
Kansas and decisions of the Kansas court permitted an action for damages against the three oil companies joined as defendants, each being
liable for the full amount. But the action was brought in a federal district court in Missouri, and the Missouri precedents, following the
majority rule, were to the effect that the damages could be apportioned
and that the defendants could not be joined in a single action. The
district judge, in an oral opinion, held that the Missouri law governed
a "matter concerning the remedy and not the right," so that there was
a misjoinder of parties. The court of appeals reversed, saying: "We
think the difference is more than a procedural one; it goes to the extent
or scope of the cause of action. The measure of the damages which
plaintiff has sustained may be the same in Missouri as in Kansas; but
the extent of the liability is quite different in the two states. We think
the difference is one of substantive right."'4
Which court is correct? Is the problem one of substance or procedure? The answer is that both are involved and that the elements
must be distinguished. The appellate court is correct in stating that the
problem whether each defendant is liable for the full damages (as one
indivisible whole) or only for his divisible part, is one of liability or
substance, and Kansas law should control. The district court is correct
in stating that joinder of parties is a matter of procedure and Missouri
law should apply. Applying this analysis it would appear that the final
3. 52 F.2d 364, 77 A.L.R. 1099 (8th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 677
(1931), 80 U. OF PA.L.Rv.449 (1932).
4.52 F.2d at 367.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 6

holding before the appellate court is correct. Kansas law determines
that each of the three defendants is liable for the full amount of the
plaintiff's damage. If Missouri procedural law had been to the effect
that joinder of defendants could be had only of joint tortfeasors in the
strict sense where there is concerted action, no joinder might have
been had here. But, though the opinion does not disclose it, the Missouri courts had indicated that joinder is appropriate for concurrent
tortfeasors, when each is liable for the full amount. 5 Joinder in this
case is therefore suitable, and the final decision is not to be construed,
as some authorities have asserted,6 that the question of joinder of
parties is a matter of substance governed by the lex Zoci delicti. 7
This construction of the case means that it is perfectly consistent
with General Steam Nay. Co. v. Guil~ou8 and Fryklund v. Great
Northern Ry.,9 two cases which have held that the problem of joinder
is a procedural one to be determined by the Zex fori. These are the only
three cases in point which have been found -with
the possible exception of the cases involving the question whether a defendant's
liability insurer may be joined as a party defendant to the tort action.
Since this problem is much broader than the scope of this article,
individual attention is not given to these cases.10
JUDGMENTS

The American view regarding joint tortfeasors is that they are liable
jointly or severally. The plaintiff may therefore sue all of them or any
one-or more of them. If he obtains a judgment against any one, he may,
so long as it is not satisfied, sue another and obtain judgment. The
5. See, e.g., Payne v. Bertman, 274 Mo. App. 690, 27 S.W.2d 28 (1930); Reynolds v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 180 Mo. App. 138, 168 S.W. 221 (1914); cf. Shafir
v. Sieben, 233 S.W. 419, 17 A.L.R. 637 (Mo. 1921).
6. See HANCocK, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 132-33 (1942); 2 RABEL,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STuDy 263 (1947). But cf. WILLIAMS,
JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 52 (1951).

7. Cf. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 245 n.74 (2d ed. 1951); 80 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 449 (1932); and see Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 231 N.C. 285, 56 S.E.2d 684
(1949). For a contracts case in which a similar analysis is applied, see Bank of
Topeka v. Eaton, 95 Fed. 355 (D. Mass. 1899).

8. 11 M. & W. 877, 152 Eng. Rep. 1061 (Ex. 1843).

9. 101 Minn. 37, 111 N.W. 727 (1907). This action (against a railroad for
personal injury) may have been in contract rather than tort, but the court
clearly holds that the lex fori governs as to "parties to suit" and therefore
might permit an action against one defendant severally.
10. When a statute permits a joinder of the tortfeasor's insurer as a party
defendant, the first question normally considered is whether the statute is to
be characterized as involving substance or procedure. The courts have differed
in their answers. Cases are collected in Notes, 120 A.L.R. 855 (1939), 54 A.L.R.
515 (1928); see also infra p. 775. Clearly procedure is involved; joinder of
parties is traditionally regarded as procedural. But the nature of the insurer's liability is affected, too. It would seem that a proper analysis of the
classification of a "direct-action statute" will show that it is both substantive
and procedural in nature. The further question of whether the substantive
aspect is to be characterized as partaking of the nature of tort or contract need
not concern us here.
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English view, until recently changed by statute, was different. In the
case of joint tortfeasors in the strict sense, a judgment against one discharged the others, the obligation being treated like a single one which
was merged into the judgment." Suppose a judgment is obtained
against one joint tortfeasor in State X, which follows the English rule,
and the plaintiff subsequently sues the second joint tortfeasor in State
Y, which follows the American rule. Can the first judgment be pleaded
as a bar? Is it entitled to full faith and credit? There seem to be no
cases in point, but some assistance may be had by considering the case
where the first judgment was in favor of the defendant.
In Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co.,12 plain-

tiff corporation charged Bigelow and Lewisohn, promoters of the
corporation, with fraudulently obtaining secret profits. A tort action
was brought against Lewisohn in the federal court in New York;
Bigelow, a domiciliary of Massachusetts, was not served and was not
a party to the action. Defendant's demurrer to the bill was sustained
and the complaint was dismissed. This action was then brought in
Massachusetts against Bigelow on the same claim. The Massachusetts
courts declined to regard the New York judgment as res judicata or as
controlling in any fashion, and held him liable. This was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of the United States.
Both the Massachusetts courts and the Supreme Court proceeded
under the assumption that "under the law of New York this judgment
[in favor of Lewisohn] would have been a bar to another suit upon
the same facts against Bigelow, in the courts of New York." This was
a minority rule, not approved by either court; 13 but the question was
whether the full faith and credit clause required Massachusetts to give
to the New York judgment "the effect of estoppel which attached to it
in the courts of New York." The answer was that "The general effect
of a judgment in a court of one State when relied upon as an estoppel
in the courts of another State is that which it has, by law or usage,
in the courts of the State from which it comes. But the faith and credit
to be accorded does not preclude an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the
court which pronounced the judgment, or its right to bind the persons
against whom the judgment is sought to be enforced."'14 Since the New
York court had no personal jurisdiction over Bigelow and the estoppel
was based only on the relationship between joint tortfeasors the Mas11. See WILLIAMS, JoInT TORTS AN CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE § 10 (1951).
Some American cases at an earlier date followed the English rule, but they

have been largely overruled and the rule "has been generally repudiated in
the United States." PROSSER, TORTS 1106 (1941). See also 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 573-75 (5th ed., Tuttle, 1925); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 94 (1942).
On the British dominions, see WILLIAMS, Op. cit, supra, at 36-37.
12. 225 U.S. 111, 32 Sup. Ct. 641, 56 L. Ed. 1009 (1912).
13. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 94, comment b (1942); cf. Note,'Res Judicata: The Requirement of Identity of Parties,91 U. OF PA. L. REv. 467 (1943).
14. 225 U.S. at 135.
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sachusetts court could decide for itself whether this relationship was
sufficient to treat Bigelow as a party by privity or representation. 15
Where A's liability in tort depends solely on the conduct of B (e.g.,
master-servant relationship), and the plaintiff's action against B re-

sults in a judgment for B, the majority rule is that the judgment constitutes a bar to a later action on the same facts against A. 1 Indeed,
the Supreme Court in the Bigelow case distinguishes this situation
from the usual joint-tortfeasor situation actually involved in the case.11
In the unlikely event that a state disagreed with this rule, could it decline to treat a judgment in favor of B in another state as a bar to an
action against A, if there had been no personal jurisdiction over A?18
It would appear that the Bigelow doctrine, as expressed in the latter
part of the opinion, is still applicable and that full faith and credit is
not required. 19 As the Restatement declares, "The law of the state
where a valid judgment is rendered determines who are in privity with
the parties to the judgment. If by the law of a state, privity is imposed
upon persons over whom the state has no jurisdiction, the judgment is
to that extent invalid."2 0 True, Bigelow was decided some forty years
ago and there have been a number of developments regarding the scope
of the full faith and credit clause since that time.21 But its effect does
not seem to have been seriously questioned.
Return may now be made to the problems with which the topic of
15. Id. at 139.

16. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 96, 99 (1942); and see Note, 133 A.L.R. 181
(1941).
17. 225 U.S. at 127-28.
18. Personal jurisdiction over a joint tortfeasor is acquired in the same way
as over any other person. In D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165, 13 L. Ed. 648
(U.S. 1850), a New York statute providing that service on one joint debtor
would permit judgment against all the joint debtors was held incapable of
giving the court jurisdiction over a nonresident debtor so as to authorize a

judgment against him enforceable in another state.
19. In Krolik v. Curry, 148 Mich. 214, 111 N.W. 761 (1907), an action brought
in Canada in the alternative for rescission of a contract for fraud or for damages, resulted in a judgment for the defendant. The present action was brought
in Michigan in fraud against the agent. It was held that the Canadian judgment
was res judicata against the plaintiff's claim, but no attention was given to the

conflicts problem.
20. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 450, comment d (1934). Cf. Behrens
v. Skelly, 173 F.2d 715, 719 (3d Cir. 1949): "The rule of that case might be
applicable if, although New York regarded these defendants as in privity with
Feuerring and Schwabacher, Pennsylvania did not. In that situation a Pennsylvania court would not be required to give faith and credit to the New York
judgment with respect to these Pennsylvania defendants if they were not
within the jurisdiction of New York. But here, as we have seen, the Pennsylvania law is in agreement with New York in regarding the defendants as in
privity ...."
21. Perhaps the one most closely in point is Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v.
Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 59 Sup. Ct. 35, 83 L. Ed. 45 (1938), suggesting that a judgment in a class action is subject to full faith and credit in other states and
binding even on persons in the class who were not personally within the jurisdiction of the court. On the effect on established privity doctrines of recent
Supreme Court cases involving the full faith and credit required for divorce
decrees, see Overton, Sister State Divorces, 22 TENN. L. REV.891, 905-10 (1953).
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judgment was introduced. What is the effect in a second state of a
judgment against a joint tortfeasor (strict sense) in a state which followed the English view that the obligation against the tortfeasors as a
whole has merged into the judgment. The Bigelow case would suggest
by analogy that the second state is not required to treat the judgment
as discharging another joint tortfeasor who was not before the court
or within its jurisdiction. Can that case be distinguished by arguing
that the judgment under the English view merged the complete obligation into the judgment so that the obligation as a whole has been extinguished and no longer exists?2 The argument may possibly have
effect; and there may eventually be a Supreme Court case on the general subject, particularly in connection with joint promises, where the
rule regarding a discharge of the joint duty has more modern appli23
cation.
Brief reference may here be made to the problem of election of
remedies. Suppose that A steals the plaintiff's chattel and sells it to B.
Plaintiff sues A in State X in quasi-contract and obtains judgment; he
subsequently sues B in trover in State Y. Under the law of X, by
bringing the action in quasi-contract or obtaining the judgment, the
plaintiff "waives the tort" so that no action can be brought in tort
against B. By the law of Y, so long as there has been no satisfaction,
the second action may be brought. Which law governs? No authority
in point has been found. 24 The problem will probably be treated as
one of procedure so that the law of the forum will apply; but it may
be characterized as substance, in which case it will be governed by the
law of the place where the conduct constituting the election took
25
place.
RELEASES

Courts are in agreement that full compensation for an injury extinguishes a claim, so that a complete satisfaction by one joint tortfeasor discharges the others. Far less agreement exists regarding the
effect of a release given to one joint tortfeasor on the obligation of the
others. The great majority of the American states hold that such a release discharges the other joint and concurrent tortfeasors; but the
British jurisdictions apply this rule only to joint tortfeasors in the
strict sense and not to concurrent tortfeasors. The rule has been
22. As to the law governing the extinguishment of a tort claim, see the
section on Releases, infra.
23. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 101 (1942).
24. Beale declares that "If an election of remedies is made in another state,
no action will be allowed in this state on the other remedy." 2 BEALE, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 450.19 (1935). This, of course, does not indicate what law determines
whether there has been an election of remedies. Two cases are cited, but
neither is in point.

25. As to possible application of the law of the place of the tort, see infra
pp. 471-72.
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sharply criticized and various devices have developed to avoid its application. It is generally held that a covenant not to sue one joint
tortfeasor, since it does not extinguish the claim, does not have the
effect of discharging another joint tortfeasor. Some courts are very
strict in regard to the language which they will construe as constituting
a covenant not to sue; others are willing to construe a document
phrased in terms of a release as a covenant not to sue. Some courts
hold that the injured party, in giving a release to one tortfeasor, may
expressly reserve his rights against others; some even hold that an oral
agreement to this effect may be shown; many hold that such reservation is ineffective. Statutes have made changes in some states, and
judicial changes seem not uncommon. 26 All of these differing rules2 7
indicate the potential presence of important problems of conflict of
laws. What law governs the effect on one joint tortfeasor of a release
given to another?
Only one case has been discovered in which the court recognized the
problem and dealt with it. In GoZdstein v. Gilbert,2 plaintiff was injured in Virginia in a collision of two cars. One driver paid her
$4,500, and she executed a "'covenant not to sue,' expressly reserving"
rights against the other driver. This apparently was also in Virginia.
This action was commenced against the second driver in West Virginia,
where a plaintiff's rights against the present defendant would not have
been discharged by the instrument. By Virginia law the plaintiff
would be barred. The court posed the question thus: "If the covenant
not to sue is held to affect the remedy alone, then the law of the forum,
or West Virginia, controls. If it operates upon the right of action, then
the law of the state under which it arose, or Virginia, controls. '2 It
declared that the birth and continued existence of the right of action
depend upon the law of the place where the accident took place and
added that "the legal effect of any conduct which might or might not
terminate that existence would necessarily be weighed in accordance
with the same law."30
The court is obviously correct in holding that the effect of a release
is a question of substance, not procedure. 31 But assuming that the ques26. See, in general, PROSSER, TORTS 1107-11 (1941); WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE §§ 9, 11, 12 (1951); Notes, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 473

(1928), 22 1V/nx. L. REv. 692 (1938), 19 VA. L. REV. 881 (1933).
27. Another possibility of variance lies in the effect of a seal. The original
common law release was an instrument under seal, not requiring a consideration; what today we call a release is actually an accord and satisfaction.
28. 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942).
29. 23 S.E.2d at 608.
30. Ibid.

31. The only possible argument that it is procedural is by analogy to the rule
on statutes of limitation, to the effect that the release or "covenant not to sue,"
does not bar the right but merely prevents the bringing of an action. But this
does not seem to have been the effect in Virginia, and the analogy would still
be ineffective.
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tion is one of substance, there still remains an important question of
conflict of laws. If the release had been given in a third state (say
Maryland), should the law of Virginia or Maryland have controlled?
Goldstein v. Gilbert seems to be an authority for the position that the
law of Virginia still controls- in view of the language used and the
fact that the court made no reference to the place where the release
was executed. In point of fact, however, this place must have been
Virginia and the court made no conscious choice between the two laws.
The authority of the case is therefore rather weak and further consideration of the problem is warranted.
Perhaps it may be profitable to consider first the question of what
law governs the effect of a release in the case of a single tortfeasor,
the law of the place of injury or the law of the place of executing the
release. Discharge of a cause of action for tort is normally said to be
controlled by the law governing the tort, the law of the place of
injury.32 Thus the effect of death of one of the parties is governed by
that law rather than the law of the place where the party died. 33 The
effect of subsequent marriage of the parties is held to be governed by
the same law.34 And limitation of actions, when it is regarded as a matter of substance rather than procedure, is treated in the same way. 35
These situations, however, all seem distinguishable. A strong argument can be made to the effect that a release is a contract between
the parties and that its effect is to be governed by the law controlling
the contract. So long as the cause of action for tort is not local and
is subject to being discharged, it seems arguable that the parties should
be able to contract for its extinguishment according to the law of the
37
place where they contract. 35 No tort cases in point have been found.
There are several cases involving release of contract claims, but they
32. See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 389.1 (1935); STU1MBERG, CONFLICT OF
189-91 (2d ed. 1951).
33. See, e.g., Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387, 54 Sup. Ct. 211, 78 L. Ed. 378
(1933); Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314 (1931); cf. Orr v.
Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691 (1928); Goodrich, Law Governing Claim
Against Deceased Tortfeasor, 19 PA. B.A.Q. 220 (1934).
34. Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931). This case is relied upon by the court in the Goldstein case.
35. See GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 86 (3d ed. 1949); STUBERG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 149-52 (2d ed. 1951). In Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 (1870), the
Island of Jamaica, having created a cause of action in tort, abolished it by
statute, and the effect of the statute was recognized in England.
36. An analogy may be drawn to the extinguishment of a claim by judgment.
The law of the state where the judgment is rendered governs, not the law
creating the claim.
37. Cf. Ciletti v. Union Pacific R.R., 196 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1952); and Frazier v.
Sims Motor Transport Lines, Inc., 196 F.2d 914 (7th Cir. 1952), where the release was given in the state of the accident and the question of its validity arose
in another state. Cases of so-called "releases" given in advance of an injury
actually involve contractual assumption of risk and do not seem to be in point.
This distinguishes Lindsay v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 226 Fed. 23 (7th Cir. 1915),
which purports to hold that a release is governed by the law of the place of
injury.
LAWS
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are somewhat inconclusive.3 The problem may therefore be said to
remain open.39
Even assuming, however, that the law of the place of the release
should be held to govern as to its effect in the case of a single tortfeasor, this does not mean that the same law governs as to the effect
on a joint tortfeasor who did not participate in the contract of release
and may never have been within the jurisdiction. In Greenwald & Co.
v. Kaster, 40 a contract case, it was held that the law of the original
contract, rather than the law of the release, controlled its effect upon
the joint debtor who did not participate.41 Though there may be distinguishable features to the case, it seems likely that a similar result
would be reached in the case of joint tortfeasors. The argument about
the freedom of the parties to contract regarding tort claims has less
relevance, and this situation seems more appropriately to come within
the generally expressed rule that the law of the tort governs its
discharge. 42
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY

The common law rule is that there can be no contribution between
joint tortfeasors. In a few states, this rule has been limited to intentional wrongdoers, while a goodly number of states and England have
38. Woodbury v. United States Cas. Co., 284 Ill. 227, 120 N.E. 8 (1918), per-

haps the strongest of the cases, suggests that the law of the release governs.
The case involves the validity of a release of insurance policies, whether it
was under seal, and whether fraud or duress might be shown. Similar conclusions may be drawn from York Metals & Alloys Co. v. Cyclops Steel Co., 280
Pa. 585, 124 Atl. 752 (1924), where there seems to be little conscious consideration of the problem; and Phelps v. Boland, 103 N.Y. 406, 9 N.E. 307 (1886),
involving discharge in bankruptcy with the creditor voluntarily submitting to

the jurisdiction. On the question of what law determines whether a negotiable

note discharges an antecedent debt, contrast Tarbox v. Childs, 165 Mass. 408,
43 N.E. 124 (1896), with Gilman v. Stevens, 63 N.H. 342, 1 Atl. 202 (1885).

Waters v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 143 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1944), is of little
assistance.
39. Compare the cases involving an employee injured by the negligence
of a third party. If he accepts workmen's compensation under the law of the
state of employment, it has been held that that statute may terminate his tort
action against the tortfeasor if it so provides. Cf. Biddy v. Blue Bird Air

Service, 374 Ill. 506, 30 N.E.2d 14 (1940); Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126,
155 Atl. 47, 49 (1931); see infra pp. 476-77.

40. 86 Pa. 45 (1878).
41. The significance of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Friedman, 64
N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1946), is hard to determine. Where the release is given
in the jurisdiction governing the original contract, there is of course no real
problem even though another state is the forum. Cf. Holdridge v. Farmers &
Mechanics' Bank, 16 Mich. 68 (1867); Scandinavian Am. Nat. Bank v. Kneeland,
24 Manitoba L.R. 168, Ann. Cas. 1917B 1177 (1914); and see Sunflower State
Bank v. Bowman, 243 S.W. 403 (Mo. App. 1922).
42. On the other hand, in support of the argument that the law of the release
should apply, it may be suggested that neither the injured party nor the second

joint tortfeasor is in a position to complain. The injured party has voluntarily
contracted to give the release in the particular state. If the law of the release
discharges the second tortfeasor, he is certainly in no position to complain;
if it does not, he is no worse off than if the release had not been given and the
law of the state in which the release was given has simply declined to affect
his obligation.
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passed statutes changing the common law rule in varying degrees. The
right to indemnity has been generally recognized from the beginning
but only in a restricted group of cases, and the states are not in complete agreement as to the requirement for permitting indemnity.4
Thus, in the field of contribution and indemnity, too, the laws of the
various states are quite likely to differ and the applicable rule of conflict of laws will frequently determine the rights of the parties.
The first conflicts problem involves the distinction between substance and procedure. Suppose that the tort takes place in State X and
one of two joint tortfeasors is sued there and pays the judgment. He
brings an action for contribution (or indemnity) in State F. Which
law determines? In Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe,44 a contribution
case, the law of X did not permit contribution while the law of F did;
it was held that the law of X prevailed and there could be no contri45
bution. In Hughes ProvisionCo. v. La Mear Poultry & Egg Co., Inc.,
an indemnity case, the law of X permitted indemnity; the court held
for the plaintiff without seeking to ascertain the law of F. Together,
therefore, these cases clearly indicate that the question is one of sub46
stance rather than procedure. This seems correct on principle.
An argument can be made for the other position, however. It would
run like this: An action for contribution is not allowed because the
parties are in pari delicto; the plaintiff's suit is dismissed because the
court will not listen to a party unworthy to appear in court on account
of his wrongdoing, and not because of lack of a valid claim.4 7 Whether
this "disability" in the plaintiff exists may be regarded as a procedural matter, to be determined by the forum. But it seems unlikely
that the argument will be sustained. The maxim, in par delicto, generally carries with it the implication that the claim itself is defective.48
43. On contribution and indemnity in general, see GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss
DSTBuTioN IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS cc. 2-5 (1936); PROSSER, TORTS 1111-17
(1941); WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE c. 4 (1951);

86-102 (1937); Bohlen, Contribution and InL.Q. 552 (1936), 22 id. 469 (1937);
Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37
IowA L. REV. 517 (1952); Gregory, ContributionAmong Tort-feasors: A Unifarm
Practice, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 365; Hodges, Contribution and Indemnitg Among
Tortfeasors, 26 TExAs L. REV. 150 (1947); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 130 (1932). For a treatment of the
civil law, see Cohn, Responsibility of Joint Wrongdoers in Continental Laws,
51 L.Q. REV. 468 (1935).
44. 366 Pa.322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951).
45. 242 S.W.2d 285 (Mo.App.1951).
46. Other cases cited later carry the same indication. Compare the cases
holding that a statute permitting contribution between tortfeasors will not have
a retroactive effect. E.g., Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 210 Ark. 575,
196 S.W.2d 919 (1946); Distefano v. Lamborn, 81 A.2d 675, 83 A.2d 300 (Del.
Super. 1951).
47. For explanation of this position in connection with illegal contracts, see
Wade, Benefits Obtained Under Illegal Transactions- Reasons For and Against
Allowing Restitution, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 31, 37-42 (1946).
48. See id. at 42-48, and passim. (In its complete form the maxim reads, In
pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.) The case of American Surety Co.
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§

demnity Between

Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL
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In one respect the law of the forum may be held to be controlling.
If it forbids the action it may be treated as establishing a public policy
which prevents a foreign-created cause of action from being brought.
This, of course, would be an undesirable result.
The more difficult conflicts problem arises when the tort occurs in
State X and the payment by one tortfeasor occurs in State Y. Which
law then determines the right to contribution? This right may be regarded as growing out of the tort and therefore properly to be controlled by the same law; or it may be regarded as an independent cause
of action based on principles of restitution and therefore to be controlled by the law of the state where the unjust enrichment was
obtained.
There appear to be no cases in which the issue is clearly and consciously decided. The two cases cited earlier as holding that the nature
of the problem is substantive and not procedural are not particularly
helpful. They both suggest that the right to contribution or indemnity
is restitutionary in nature but seem to indicate that the law of the place
49
of injury controls.
Another pair of cases also indicates that it is the lex loci delicti which
governs. In Charnock v. Taylor,50 a collision occurred in Tennessee,
injuring the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued defendant in North Carolina and
defendant answered, claiming that if he was liable a transportation
company was joint tortfeasor with him and asking for contribution in
case recovery was had against him. The company, having been served
in accordance with North Carolina practice, demurred to defendant's
answer and it was held that the demurrer should be sustained on the
ground that Tennessee law, which did not give a right to contribution,
v. Wrightson, 103 L.T. 663 (1911), may possibly be regarded as holding that
the problem of contribution is procedural. There one of two insurance companies paid a claim and sought contribution from the other, and the court
applied English law as "the tribunal to which the party who is required to do
equity is subject." This has also been construed to mean that the law of the
domicil of the debtor is applicable. See WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
244 (2d ed. 1950); cf. GnAVEsoN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 320 (2d ed. 1952). The
argument that the problem is procedural is also made in 6 MIAMI L.Q. 121, 123
(1951).
49. In Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368, 375 (1951),
the court said: "Since the right of contribution is a quasi-contractual right
arising by reason of an implied engagement of each to help bear the common
burden, if such contractual obligation is not recognized as existing in the
State where the accident occurred it cannot be enforced in any other jurisdiction." In Hughes Provision Co. v. La Mear Poultry & Egg Co., Inc., 242
SW.2d 285, 289 (Mo. App. 1951), the court said: "The duty to indemnify in
such cases arises by operation of law, independent of contract. It rests on
the principle that the original act of delivering the article is wrongful and
that such a tortfeasor is responsible for the natural consequences of his wrongful act," citing the Restatement of Restitution § 96. But all of the discussion
of the conificts problem is in terms of the proper law governing a tort and the
determination of the place of injury. See the treatment of the problem in
Dauber, New Jersey Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, 7 RUTGERs L. REV.
380, 393-94 (1953).
50. 223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911, 148 A.L.R. 1126 (1943).
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controlled. Here, of course, there had been no judgment obtained
against the party seeking contribution and no payment by him, hence
no acquired unjust enrichment. Still the unjust enrichment was potentially present and the North Carolina law could have been applied
to prevent its inception. Instead, the court talked solely in terms of the
law governing the tort.5'
Conversely, in Bache v. Dixie-Ohio Express Co.,52 where an automobile accident happened in Kentucky and the action was brought in
federal district court in Georgia, an unlimited right of contribution
was allowed by Kentucky law but not by Georgia law.53 The court al-

lowed a third-party defendant to be impleaded so that a judgment for
contribution might be rendered against it, saying: "The substantive
law of the State of Kentucky governs the question of the liability of
54
the third-party defendant to respond to the third party plaintiff."
The cumulative effect of these cases, and of certain others whose
significance is not as clear,55 is to indicate that the strong current of
the authorities is that the Zex loci delicti governs the right to contribution or indemnity. Despite the force of these authorities a logical argument can be made for the other view. The claim for contribution is
quasi-contractual or restitutionary in character - an obligation created
by law for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment. And, as the
Restatement declares, "When a person is alleged to have been unjustly
eariched, the law of the place of enrichment determines whether he is
'
under a duty to repay the amount by which he has been enriched."51. "No case under similar conflict of laws has been brought to our attention
involving a demand for contribution between joint tort-feasors, but the rule
[that the lex loci delicti governs] is broad enough to cover that situation, since
such demand would not arise except as it grew out of the tortious transaction
and the relation thus brought about between the parties." 26 S.E.2d at 913.
52. 8 F.R.D. 159 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
53. Georgia law permitted contribution but only between parties against
whom a joint judgment had been obtained. See Vaughn v. Guenther, 8 F.R.D.
157 (N.D. Ga. 1948), decided by the same court on the same day. In the principal case the original defendant had asked for indemnity but the court found
that this was not available and treated the request for indemnity to include
contribution.
54. 8 F.R.D. at 159.
55. Brady v. Black Diamond S.S. Co., 45 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) seems
to be similar to the two cases just discussed. See also Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Paton, 194 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1952), a workmen's compensation case, to be
discussed later. A number of cases simply refer to the law of the place of injury
without discussing the conflicts problem in any way and without indicating
where the payment was made. In some of them the facts are such as to make
it not unlikely that payment was made in a different state. See, e.g., Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Crown Coach Co., 178 F.2d 628 (8th Cir.
1949); Hodges v. United States F. & G. Co., 91 A.2d 473 (D.C. Mun. App. 1952).
In some other cases the court discloses a recognition of the problem but does
not need to decide it. See, e.g., Barber S.S. Lines, Inc. v. Quinn Bros., Inc., 104
F. Supp. 78, 80 (S.D. Mass. 1952); Roth v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
12 F.R.D. 383, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
56. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 453 (1934). Cf. id. § 452: "The law of

a place where a benefit is conferred determines whether the conferring of the
benefit creates a right against the recipient to have compensation." See, in
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There is also case authority to support the principle.57 Certain suretyship cases may well be regarded as applying it to the question of contribution.58 In none of the tort decisions did the court appear to realize
clearly the decision being made or that it was acting contrary to the
rule expressed in the Restatement.5 9
Another group of cases in a related field may have particular significance here. They involve the situation where an injured employee has
a claim under a workmen's compensation statute against his employer
and a tort claim against the tortfeasor who injured him. Here the
employer and the tortfeasor are not joint tortfeasors, but in a sense
their liabilities cover the same injury. Assume that the employer (or
his insurer) pays under the compensation statute of State X (the state
of employment) and that this statute provides that the employer (or
his insurer) is entitled to recover against the tortfeasor. The law of
State Y, where the tort occurred, does not so provide. Can the employer prevail in an action against the tortfeasor? Several courts have
said that to apply the statute of State X is to give it an improper
extraterritorial effect and that the lex loci delicti must govern the
tortfeasor's liability. 60 They have generally not even considered the

possibility of holding that the statute is simply providing for a right
accord, Gutteridge and Lipstein, Conflicts of Law in Matters of Unjustifiable
Enrichment, 7 CAMB. L.J. 80 (1939).
57. See Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Douredoure, 154 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1946) (overpayment by mistake); cf. Brackett v. Norton. 4 Conn. 517, 10 Am. Dec. 179
(1823) (services rendered).
58. In Aldrich v. Aldrich, 56 Vt. 324, 48 Am. Rep. 791 (1883), a note was
given in Vermont with plaintiff and defendant as sureties. The Vermont statute
of limitations had run. Plaintiff voluntarily but not with fraudulent intent
went to New Hampshire, where the statute had not run. There he was sued
and judgment obtained. Having paid, he sued defendant for contribution
in Vermont. In holding for the plaintiff, the court said: "The legal right of
sureties as against each other is not governed by the lex loci contractuts;
neither is there any implied obligation that they shall reside or remain in
any particular locality. The right to contribution among co-sureties is not
founded on the contract of suretyship, but is based on an equity arising from
the relation of the co-sureties. The right of action for contribution accrues
when one has paid more than his proportion of their liability. It is an equity
which arises when the relation of co-sureties is entered into, and upon which
a cause of action accrues, when one has paid more than his proportion of the
debt for which they were bound." 56 Vt. at 327. Cf. Frew v. Schoular, 101 Neb.
131, 162 N.W. 496, L.R.A. 1917F 1065, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 511 (1917).
59. Where is the "place of enrichment" or the "place where a benefit is
conferred"? Normally this would be regarded as the place where payment
is made. But the suggestion has been made that since the "enrichment" is the
satisfaction of an obligation, the place of that enrichment may be the state
where the tortious obligation arose -the
lex loci delicti. WILLIAMS, JOINT
TORTS AND CONTRmUTORY NEGLIGENCE § 39 (1951).

Is it necessary that there be

a payment or satisfaction in order for some law other than the lex loci delicti
to apply? What about the cases involving third-party practice, where the
defendant seeks to bring a third-party defendant in for the purpose of obtaining contribution?
60. See, e.g., Hendricksen v. Crandic Stages, Inc., 216 Iowa 643, 246 N.W.
913 (1933); Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 176 Wis. 521, 187 N.W. 746
(1922); cf. Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948).
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of indemnity governed by the law of State X.61
But some workmen's compensation statutes provide that the employee's right of action is assigned to the employer. The assignment
takes place in State X where the payment is made and there is no
creation of a new cause of action. 62 The result is that the majority of
the courts which have talked in terms of an assignment have had no
difficulty in holding that the law of State X applies.63 In other cases,
either the statute or the opinion speaks in terms of subrogation
(which, after all, is a form of equitable assignment), and thus in many
64
instances the decision is that the employer can prevail.
The relevance of these cases to the joint-tortfeasor situation should
be apparent. It is true that where contribution is not permitted between joint tortfeasors an express assignment by the injured party to
one tortfeasor is ineffective. 65 But this rule should have no application
when both payment and express assignment are made in a state permitting contribution. 66 The express assignment may not be necessary
61. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Paton, 194 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1952), where
the statute of limitation had run on the original death action against the tortfeasor, the court held that the California workmen's compensation act could
not "add to the consequences of the negligent operation of a truck on an
Oregon highway." Id. at 768. The court subsequently discussed the "common
law right of indemnity" and found there was none, but it failed to perceive
the conflicts problem here.
62. In connection with the creation of a new cause of action, compare the
cases holding that the employer's action against the third party tortfeasor
is subject to the same statute of limitations as the employee's action. See discussion in 2 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 75.30 (1952).
63. See particularly the discussions in Alexander v. Creel, 54 F. Supp. 652,
656-57 (E.D. Mich. 1944); and Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 155 Atl. 47, 49'
(1931), involving the provisions of the New York Workmen's Compensation
Act. See also Betts v. Southern Ry. 71 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1934); cf. Biddy v.
Blue Bird Air Service, 374 Ill. 506, 30 N.E. 2d 14 (1940); Scott v. Missouri
Pacific R.R., 333 Mo. 374, 62 S.W.2d 834 (1933).
Difficulties may exist where the employee is killed and the beneficiaries under the wrongful death statute and the workmen's compensation statute are
not the same. See, e.g., Betts v. Southern Ry., 71 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1934).
Application of the real-party-in-interest statutes and questions of which
party must bring suit and what parties must be joined are of course matters
of procedure, to be determined by the lex $ori. See, e.g., Maryland to Use of
Carson v. Acme Poultry Corp., 9 F.R.D. 687 (D. Del. 1949); Saloshin v. Houle,
85 N.H. 126, 155 Atl. 47 (1931).
64. See Dinardo v. Consumers Power Co., 181 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1950); Maryland to Use of Carson v. Acme Poultry Corp., 9 F.R.D. 687 (D. Del. 1949);
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. United States Electrical Co., 55 Ohio App. 107,
9 N.E.2d 157 (1936); cf. Koepp v. Northwest Freight Lines, 10 F.R.D. 524 (D.
Minn. 1950); General Acc. F. & L.A. Corp., Ltd. v. Zerbe Const. Co. Inc., 269
N.Y. 227, 199 N.E. 89 (1935). But cf. Personius v. Asbury Transp. Co., 152 Ore.
286, 53 P.2d 1065 (1936). See, in general, 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW § 88.20 (1952); 3 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 840 (Perm.

ed. 1943); WRIGHT, SUBROGATION UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS § 9
(1948).
65. See, e.g., Slater v. Ianni Const. Co., 268 Mich. 492, 256 N.W. 495 (1934);
Manowitz v. Kanov, 107 N.J.L. 423, 154 Atl 326, 75 A.L.R. 1464 (1931); Esten v.
Rosen, 63 Ont. L.R. 210, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 275 (App. Div. 1928).
66. Cf. Anstine v. Pennsylvania R.R., 352 Pa. 547, 43 A.2d 109, 160 A.L.R. 981
(1945). Contrast this case with Boyer v. Bolender, 129 Pa. 324, 18 Atl. 127
(1889), decided when contribution between joint tortfeasors was not permitted
in the state.
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if the court implies it as a matter of law, and the equitable doctrine
of subrogation seems very appropriate here and may well be applied
67
by a sympathetic court.
The conclusion to be drawn is that a joint tortfeasor seeking contribution should first seek a forum which will not be inclined to throw
the case out because of a local public policy. If then contribution is
permitted by the law either of the place of the tort or of the place of
payment, he should have a good chance of succeeding, since he needs
only to characterize the nature of his claim in such a fashion as to make
the desired law apply.
67. Compare Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Myers, 288 Ky. 337, 156
S.W.2d 161, 138 A.L.R. 1461 (1941), where the question was whether a nonresident motorist statute covering "any civil suit or proceeding ... arising out
of or by reason of any accident," should apply to a suit for contribution between
joint tortfeasors. In holding that it did, the court said: "The primary liability
of appellee, if he was negligent, was to the injured person, but, by payment
of the claim, appellant became subrogated to the injured person s right to
recover from appellee to the extent of one-half of any reasonable amount paid
by appellant.... It is true the right in appellant to maintain the action arises
from a contract implied from the provisions of section 484a [providing for
contribution] but the subject matter of the proceeding arose out of and by
reason of the accident." 156 S.W.2d at 163.
See also Retelle v. Sullivan, 191 Wis. 576, 211 N.W. 756, 50 A.L.R. 1106
(1927). On subrogation where indemnity between tortfeasors is possible,
see 50 Am. JuR., Subrogation § 38 (1944). On subrogation between joint
debtors, see SH.nDoN, SUBROGATION c. 4 (1882); 50 Am. Jur., Subrogation §§
67-69 (1944); Note, 99 Am. St. Rep. 474, 531-33 (1904).

